Christian Germany and global power politics: On the controversy between Johannes Lepsius and Friedrich Naumann

Presentation at the international conference “Johannes Lepsius and Dealing with the Armenian Genocide” on 26/27 November 2010 at the House of Brandenburg-Prussian History in Potsdam.

I.

At the 11th Evangelical Social Congress, which took place on June 7 and 8, 1900 in Karlsruhe,^[1] There was a controversy between Johannes Lepsius and Friedrich Naumann over the fundamental question of the relationship between Christianity and politics.

The Evangelical Social Congress^[2] was founded 10 years earlier by theologians, economists, politicians and lawyers. He set himself the task of examining the social conditions of the people without prejudice, to measure them against the moral and religious demands of the Gospel and to make them fruitful himself for today's economic life. The founding members included Adolf Stöcker and Adolf von Harnack. After the conservative wing around Nathusius and 1896 Stöcker left with some of his followers, the Evangelical Social Congress became a forum of liberal and progressive Protestantism, which was more focused on questioning social ethics than dogmatics. Secretary General of Congress from 1898 — 1902 was Paul Rohrbach, who also arranged the invitation of Johannes Lepsius as a speaker.^[3]

The topic given to the speakers on the second day of the Congress was: “What are the moral and social tasks of Germany's development as a world power for our people? “Lepsius essentially gives the following answer to the question: In the end, Germany's claim to world power” is rooted in the spiritual and moral values of our people, in the fact that we Germans are the first appointed bearers of the Gospel in contemporary culture. ”^[4] And he concludes: “If we Germans want to fulfill our world mission, we must remain Germans and must remain Christians. ”^[5] From the context of Christianity and claim to world power, it follows for Lepsius that the message of the Gospel is also and particularly valid for German global power politics.

In a speech, Friedrich Naumann firmly rejects the Christian foundation of politics undertaken by Lepsius. He insists to Lepsius that foreign policy is about the struggle between peoples for world power and that Christianity has nothing to say about it. Naumann considers it “more Protestant, more honest and easier” to recognize the struggle between peoples for power as a fact.^[6] He ends his contribution with the sentence: “But we will do best if we believe that God is giving us a task, and that simply means: You, people that you have become, have discipline and strength. But I also have the necessary external power. ”^[7]

II.

What is behind it? Before discussing details of the debate between Lepsius and Naumann, it is important to outline the current historical and political context and the roles of Naumann and Lepsius in this context in broad outline.^[8]

Since the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was threatened with disintegration. The multi-ethnic state was governed centrally and was based on a sophisticated system of political, legal and tax inequality at the expense of ethnic minorities. There were constant tensions between ethnic groups and the state administration, which escalated violently again and again. The failure of European-style reform attempts and a series of territorial losses as a result of lost arms cast a gloomy light on the future of the Reich. The “oriental question,” which focused on the fate of the Ottoman Empire, preoccupied politicians and the public in Europe for decades. On the one hand, the prospect of a political, economic and military collapse of the Ottoman Empire aroused the desire among the major European powers to inherit the “sick man on the Bosporus.” On the other hand, it was precisely these ambitions that aroused concerns about the delicate balance of power between the European powers.

An essential part of the Oriental question was the Armenian question. In Article 9 of the Paris Treaty of 1856, which ended the Crimean War, the major European powers had already assumed the protection of all Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The treaty confirmed a decree issued by the Sultan, which guaranteed equal rights to the Muslim and Christian subjects of his empire. But the Ottoman leadership had categorically rejected control over the implementation of reforms by the major European powers. The implementation of the reforms remained entirely in the hands of the Ottoman Empire. With the exception of Lebanon and Crete, where extensive autonomy of Christian minorities was achieved, the reform promises remained unfulfilled.

The Balkan crisis of 1875 — 1878 ended with the loss of almost the entire European territories of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 resulted in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro becoming independent after centuries of Ottoman rule. The Ottoman Empire lost Cyprus to England and Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary. The Russian army was in the West at the gates of Istanbul. In the east, it had conquered several Armenian provinces in a short period of time. The warring parties signed the San Stefano Peace Treaty on March 3, 1878. Article 16 provided for the Armenian provinces to be occupied by Russia. A condition for the withdrawal of Russian troops was the commitment of the High Door to immediate reforms and protective measures for the Armenians. The other major European powers, especially England, saw this development as a risk of a significant expansion of the Russian sphere of power, which threatened the European balance of power.

At the Berlin Conference of 1878, at which the host Germany presented itself as an “honest broker” with no interest in influence in the Middle East of its own, the tensions and conflicts between the major European powers that had arisen as a result of the Balkan crisis and the Russian-Turkish War were settled. Particularly at the insistence of England, Article 16 of the San Stefano Preliminary Treaty was replaced by Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty. The High Door continued to commit itself to improvements and reforms in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians and to provide Armenians with protection against Circassians and Kurds. But in order to implement this obligation in practice, the High Door only “had to inform, within certain periods of time, of the measures taken for this purpose to the powers which will supervise their implementation.” England had concluded the Cyprus Treaty with the High Door a few weeks before the Berlin Conference. In return for permission to occupy Cyprus, England had committed itself to guarantee the sultan the provinces of Asia Minor, in particular Armenia, with weapons if necessary. England and Russia had thus mutually neutralized each other on the Armenian issue. The result was a weak guarantee of protection for Armenians, which lacked effective means of pressure and control.

As a result, the Ottoman Empire was able to address the Armenian question largely in a dilatory way. The Armenian question remained a permanent conflict. There was no real willingness on the part of the Sultan to carry out the reforms to which the Ottoman Empire had committed itself. The major European powers were unable to force the reforms. Their diplomatic pressure, however, reinforced Armenians' hopes for reform. As pressure from the major European powers increased more and more, Sunni groups, relying on the sultan, Abdul Hamid II, wanted to thwart the reform process. They organized massacres in cities and in the countryside, which killed more than 100,000 Armenians in 1895 and 1896. The attackers mostly organized themselves in mosques and received active or passive support from the authorities.

III.

As late as 1895, the first news of the massacres of the Armenian population in the east and south of the Ottoman Empire reached Germany. These reports were assessed differently by the German public. Axel Meissner reconstructed the journalistic controversy surrounding “the truth about Armenia” in his dissertation “Martin Rades “Christian World” and Armenia “published this year.^[9] In summary, it can be stated that some of the reports about the massacres of Armenians, which initially came primarily from English sources, were dismissed as English atrocity propaganda in the sense of the Anglophobia that was widespread at the time. Where the reports were taken seriously, there were differences of opinion as to whether they were in fact measures initiated and systematically organized by the government of the Ottoman Empire, or whether they were rather spontaneous outbreaks of popular anger against the Armenians or legitimate measures taken by the state to suppress Armenian uprisings. The Reich government and the vast majority of the German press shared the official Turkish account that it was only a matter of suppressing a revolt. Accusations against the Ottoman government were unwelcome. In politics and economics, a close partnership with the Ottoman Empire was desired, which should enable Germany in future to gradually expand its political, economic and military influence in the Middle East in competition with the other major European powers. Against this background, the Christian activities of helping Armenians were met with sharp criticism. According to the Hamburger Nachrichten, “the pastors, who regard it as their task to use the Church on this side for the Armenian terrorist gangs of murderers, will have to be stopped by the state. ”^[10]

The “Truth about Armenia” also occupied liberal Protestant circles in Germany. The magazine “Christian World” published by Martin Rade played a particularly important role here, which gave wide space to the discussion of the Armenian question and Christian relief work for Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. The focus of the disputes shifted more and more to the question of whether Christians should limit themselves to charitable assistance for the Armenian victims or whether they should also campaign politically for the Armenians, i.e. whether they should also try to influence the politics of the Reich Government.

In this context, which is only roughly outlined here — more details are presented in detail by Meissner — Johannes Lepsius and Friedrich Naumann exemplify opposing poles of debate — and, as will be seen, of action as well.

Johannes Lepsius^[11] had already developed a lively interest in the Orient at home. His father was Egyptologist Richard Lepsius.^[12] During his work as a teacher and assistant minister in Jerusalem, Johannes Lepsius had deepened this interest. Since 1887, Lepsius was a pastor in Friesdorf near Wippra in the southern Harz. Together with other brothers, he founded a prayer association for the Orient Mission of the Mohammedans in 1895, from which the German Orient Mission emerged in 1896. After Lepsius had received a diplomatic report on the massacres of the Armenians, he, disguised as a carpet dealer, traveled to the massacre areas in May and June 1896 to see for himself the persecutions of the Armenians. With 9000 Swiss francs from donations from the South German community movement and the Evangelical Alliance, he was able to found two orphanages in Talas and Urfa as emergency aid, which were supervised by American missionaries. After his return, he immediately tried to inform the German public about the findings of his trip, initially in a series of newspapers entitled “The Truth About Armenia.” In August 1896, he published the first major documentary about the persecution of Armenians under the title “Armenia and Europe,” which he combines with an appeal to the responsibility of the major Christian European powers to save the Armenian people. The book was translated into English and French in 1897 and has received great international feedback. In Germany, Lepsius is launching an extensive educational campaign with meetings, lectures and articles.

At the same time, Lepsius is making every effort to collect donations and organize aid for the Armenian victims. He assumes the role of secretary of the Berlin Committee of the Armenian Relief Organization, which works together with the Frankfurt Committee chaired by Rev. Ernst Lohmann. Orphanages, medical stations, schools and businesses are being built in Asia Minor, the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Persia and Russia. Lepsius is moving the carpet factory, which he had built in Friesdorf to create jobs there, to Urfa.

Can you, especially as a Christian, object to public relations and aid work for the benefit of the persecuted Armenians? You could, and one of the most influential critics was Friedrich Naumann.

Friedrich Naumann^[13] Like Lepsius, he was a priest. He was initially a supporter of the Christian-social movement around court preacher Adolf Stöcker. He also regarded a socially just organization of society as a challenge for Christianity, which had lost a large part of the workforce to Social Democracy. The year 1896 was a turning point for Naumann. Under the influence of Max Weber, he became one of the most important political and journalistic representatives of “liberal imperialism.” He founded the “National Social Association,” which expressly pursued the goal of winning over the broad masses of workers, including the working class, for German world politics. Social and political reforms should be achieved in an alliance of democracy and monarchy. It is true that, as Wolfgang Mommsen writes, in the few years of its existence, the National Social Association remained a kind of spiritual general staff of the educated who never succeeded in penetrating the workforce.^[14] But in the magazine “Die Hilfe” published by him, Naumann continued to give imperialist thought a lot of space. In addition to Naumann, Paul Rohrbach and Ernst Jäckh, the “actual propagandists” of “liberal imperialism,” should be mentioned in particular^[15], in which Jaeckh propagated an expansive German oriental policy and was therefore actually already in the camp of the national liberals.

If you keep in mind the basic features of classical liberalism, in particular the liberal ideal of limiting state power as a condition of civil freedom, from today's perspective, you involuntarily ask yourself how liberalism and imperialism fit together in the first place. That would be a separate topic. I must limit myself to a few highlights here.

In international comparison, German liberalism is particularly committed to imperialism. What are the reasons? Wolfgang Mommsen^[16] points to several factors. First of all, it plays a role that liberal ideas have always had only a weak foothold in Germany. From the very beginning of its development, German liberalism emphasized the idea of individual autonomy and self-government, but not the principle of self-government of citizens. He basically wanted nothing to do with the idea of popular sovereignty. In addition, the idea of free trade has not taken particularly deep roots in the German liberal movement. Unlike in England, Germany had not had a long period of rapid economic growth under the aegis of free trade, so that the idea that the capitalist economic system must be fundamentally cosmopolitan and geared towards free exchange on an international scale had not been ingrained in deep. In addition, the specific connection between German liberalism and the national idea had created the willingness to sacrifice basic liberal principles in whole or in part, if and to the extent that they came into conflict with national interests.

The sociological finding of the low unity of the bourgeoisie corresponded to the weak anchoring of specifically liberal thinking in the political consciousness of the Germans. The talk of “education and ownership” is an indication that the German bourgeoisie has never developed a truly uniform ethos. The decisive factor for this was that liberal ideas only achieved a breakthrough in Germany when the bourgeoisie was already exposed to the upheavals of a pluralistic industrial society with highly differentiated incomes.

Liberalism also lacked uniformity at the political level. Since the revolution of 1848/49 at least, the fragmentation of liberal forces has been a constant of German development. In addition, the opportunity to draw workers into their own camp from the outset by adequately representing their interests was thoroughly squandered.

Against the backdrop of the fragmentation of liberalism, which had no convincing answers to the social question and to the new challenges of the modern economic and social structure, the idea of a powerful German world politics based on the English model also appeared to Naumann and liberal imperialism as an opportunity to renew the liberal movement. A successful overseas expansion policy was seen as an essential prerequisite for progressive constitutional and social policy, especially as the “food supply” of the broad masses seemed to depend on it. A thorough modernization of the social and constitutional system seemed necessary simply because large-scale world politics could not be carried out with traditional elites and could only be successful if, in an emergency, it could count on the support of the broad layers of the nation. World politics should ultimately create the economic conditions for the permanent integration of the workforce.

Since 1896, imperialist thinking gradually encompassed almost the entire liberal movement and largely swept the opposing forces aside. One of the basic assumptions from which liberal imperialism as well as the national liberals were based was the idea that in the coming period of world history only those nations which expand into world empires would still be able to maintain an independent position. In this respect, world power politics only appeared as a compelling continuation of national politics in the age of the world state system.

IV.

How did Friedrich Naumann react to the Armenian question, and how did he react in particular to the Christian aid programs for Armenians?^[17] In 1898, Naumann accompanied Kaiser Wilhelm II, whom he hoped would combine world politics and progressive social reform, on his journey to the Middle East.^[18] In one of his travel letters, which he published in the magazine “Die Hilfe” published by him, he gave without his own comment the verdict of a German master potter in Constantinople. “I am a Christian and consider charity to be the first commandment, and I say that the Turks did the right thing when they killed the Armenians. Otherwise, the Turk cannot protect himself from the Armenians, who exploit his nobility, laziness and superficiality in the most irresponsible way. The Armenian is the worst guy in the world. ”¹⁹ This was met with a strong response from the German and French press. Criticism was particularly severe in the “Christian World” published by Martin Rade. This prompted Naumann to defend himself against criticism in the Christian world.^[19] He first clarifies that the opinion expressed in his travel letter is not entirely in line with his own position. As a neutral journalist, he had only reproduced the spectrum of points of view. Naumann then admits that 80,000 to 100,000 people fell victim to the Hamidian massacres. In view of this, there could only be one verdict at all, namely a full, angry, severe conviction of the murderers and their instigators. On the other hand, Naumann shows sympathy for the Turks' self-defense and sees the Armenian question primarily as an intra-Turkish political issue, as “a part of the death struggle of an ancient great empire that does not want to be killed without last bloody rescue attempts. ”^[20] Analyzing the foreign policy implications of the relationship between Turks and Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, Naumann writes: Anyone who wants to destroy the Ottoman Empire supports the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Syrians, Armenians for this purpose. The procedure is as follows: “You demand human rights or humanity or civilization or political freedom, in short, something that equates them to the Turks.” Such demands led to “revolutionary effects.” They promoted the separatism of national minorities and gave the major European powers a lever to dissolve the Ottoman Empire. Under diplomatic pressure, the High Door must agree to the reform plans of the European powers. But: “As soon as Turkey has enough air to breathe again, its self-preservation instinct must prompt it to shake off the forced promise. (...) There was a risk that Turkey would perish as a result of the Armenian question. She helped herself with a barbaric Asian coup: it decimated the Armenians to such an extent that they would not be able to act politically in the next period. ”

Against this background, even as a Christian, you could waver as to how you should stand. Naumann points out that sympathy rallies have indirectly become the cause of death for Armenians. Above all, however, he objects against standing up for the Armenians, which would thwart the policies of the German government. Our policy in the East was set for a long time; we belonged to the group of protectors of Turkey. In its current balance of forces, Germany could not yet pursue an English-style policy. The English could revolutionize because they were capable of occupying. We need time to grow and grow. Recognizing and waiting for this time of ours is also, in its way, part of fulfilling God's will.

In fact, Germany's interest in political and economic relations with the Ottoman Empire had long since grown significantly. The trip of Emperor Wilhelm II was also an expression of this interest. German politicians maintained that Germany did not pursue its own interests. But Germany offered itself as a protective power. In Damascus, Wilhelm II declared himself the patron of all Muslims. Nonetheless, the ideas that German companies could play a leading role in Turkey's economic development and modernization and that Turkey could be an area of expansion of German influence and German world power in the long term inspired fantasies. An important step along this path was the Baghdad Railway project, for which the contracts were signed during William II's journey. Naumann builds on these interests.

In the book edition of his travel report^[21] Naumann adds a sharp criticism of Christian Germany. No one would want to prevent zealous Christians from, as it were, bandaging the victims under the wheel. “It is only necessary to demand that the acts of love never become political acts that thwart our German state policy. We are firmly convinced that our people also serve Christianity best when they keep themselves strong in the battle of peoples. ”^[22] Anyone who is international should support English politics and help the Armenians. Anyone who is national must remain AuBismarck's path in foreign politics.

V.

The 11th Evangelical Social Congress on June 7 and 8, 1900 in Karlsruhe Lepsius offered a forum to explain his practical aid work, but also his political commitment for the Armenians. And Friedrich Naumann, in turn, took the opportunity to justify his criticism of Christian Armenian aid.

Lepsius focuses entirely on the fundamental question of the relationship between Christianity and politics. If religion, Christianity and the Gospel have a factual understanding of the major problems of internal and external politics, he asks, and he states that the manifold disputes between Christianity and politics have led almost across the board to the result that politics do not concern either the priest or the Christian. And with regard to the “Christian-social” movement, he diagnoses that even its leaders thought they had to leave the banner “evangelical-social” and “national-social” — an unequivocal allusion to Naumann, who will fiercely defend himself against it — to take fundamentally different paths. Lepsius accuses these directions of having left the old trail of the Evangelical Social Congress, which wanted to give Christian ideas a direct influence on public opinion and thus also on politics, untouched by ecclesiastical and political party spirit. Lepsius criticizes the fact that Christianity is increasingly being expelled from public life into the home, into the nursery and into the female sphere of existence. “Practicing Christianity means:” says Lepsius, “connecting and healing the wounds that the struggle for existence has inflicted on individual or entire ethnic classes of people, but not taking up, directing and leading to victory the struggle itself. Christianity is and remains the sister of mercy on the battlefield. But before seeing the struggle itself, it conceals its face and does not dare to enter into “the struggle of powers to gain rights.”^[23]

Lepsius opposes this view of Christianity, which is limited to a merciful role of help and consolation, with his view of the Gospel as “the guiding force in history.” For him, Christianity is the organizing force of the formation of people and states. This applies to him in particular in view of the current phase of the development of world politics at the time. Lepsius outlines a philosophy of history, according to which the meaning of modern history lies in the gradual implementation of Christian ideas, in the realisation of the Kingdom of God on earth. Hans-Lukas Kieser has shed light on the Anglo-Saxon sources of inspiration for this thinking.^[24]

For Lepsius, it is not the nationality principle and not racial antagonisms that are the driving forces of history. But: “We are therefore already faced with the fact that only a small number of powers have a decisive influence on the fate of the peoples, and that these few powers are all Christian and three of them are Germanic and Protestant, England, Germany and the United States. This fact cannot be a random one. Does it not prove that Christianity is already the most powerful force building world states? ”^[25] Lepsius continues: “The cause which gave Protestantism the lion's share of world domination and Christian world powers rule over the world lies precisely in Christianity, in the Gospel itself. World history has been the story of Christ's reign over the earth for two millennia. The Kingdom of God has a political history. Because “Kingdom of God” is not only a religious term, but also a political one. The goal of world power politics, willingly or unintentionally, consciously or unconsciously, is Christ's rule over the world. And although the apostles expected the establishment of the Kingdom of Christ only after the return of their Master, Christ's parables of the Kingdom of God teach that Jesus himself had an evolutionist view of the growth of this kingdom. ”^[26] Lepsius draws the conclusion from this: “It is not the national idea, not race, not economic imperatives, but only the expansive power of Christian culture that establish the right to world domination. ”^[27] According to Lepsius, Germany's claim to world power is based on the fact that the Germans, the people of the Reformation, would have understood best how to combine their internal tasks, their Christian ideas and values, with the tasks of shaping the outside world.

During the debate on the presentations, Friedrich Naumann sharply criticizes Lepsius. First, he raises “personal protest” against the fact that the advocacy of a specific national-social policy should somehow remove or alienate the Evangelical Social Congress.^[28] And then Naumann formulates the essence of his opposition to Lepsius: “With regard to foreign policy, we have heard today an attempt to develop foreign policy with a kind of Christian foundation, so to speak, from the Gospel; and I must confess, having heard this attempt, I believe that no service can be provided in this way to the Gospel or to external politics. There are difficulties here which are extremely great because our current political period is a period of struggling nations. Admittedly, not every nation is capable of fighting, admittedly that we must join foreigners, after all, today, struggle is the principle in the politics of large bodies of state based on nations. ” Naumann, against the attempt to establish a Christian foundation for world power politics, is also seeking an interpretation of history that has progressed from a kind of internationalism in Roman times at the time of Jesus and from the family of nations united under Catholicism to national development. When the Gospels were written, such a national policy could not have existed at all. Even though Jesus and Paul contain a number of passages in which a certain love for the people is addressed, the idea of power and self-preservation of an individual tribe, a race, a part of humanity remains alien to the New Testament. Without this idea, however, foreign policy could not be understood and justified. Against this background, Naumann rejects the concept of the Kingdom of God as a political concept. And he criticizes a dishonesty of thought that lies in pursuing power politics, but, like the English, of claiming that this is done in the service of humanity and Christianity. “We're no better than the English,” says Naumann, “we want to have what we can have on the world map as well as they want.” (...) “But we should not say that the principle that drives us is the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. ”^[29] Naumann therefore asks whether it is not “more Protestant, more honest and easier” to say that they are struggles and we want to recognize them as such. You can certainly recognize a power struggle and “do not have to undress yourself from ethics.” And further “It is only a question of what is really the basis, the natural struggle for existence among peoples, being actually recognized and pronounced as such. ”^[30] Naumann concludes his contribution with the sentence quoted at the beginning that God has given the people the task of maintaining the necessary power even externally.^[31]

VI.

In his closing remarks, Lepsius says about Naumann's criticism: “I'm coming from my preconditions, from my understanding of Christianity, to exactly the same practical result as him, and if I had the task of doing politics, I would certainly follow Naumann's paths in foreign policy, in internal politics. Our difference lies not in understanding the nature and method of politics, but in understanding Christianity. ” However, when the Armenian genocide took place in the years from 1915, to which at least 1 million, but probably 1.5 million Armenians fell victim, Lepsius and Naumann again acted in opposite ways. In 1916, Lepsius sent out his “Report on the Situation of the Armenian People in Turkey” with deliberate disregard for the will of the Reich Government and circumventing military censorship. Naumann, on the other hand, is silent — yes he, a leading representative of left-wing liberalism and cultural Protestantism, is ostentatiously closing ranks with the “Committee for Unity and Progress,” which is responsible for the genocide. At the laying of the cornerstone of the “House of Friendship” supported by the Turkish-German Association on April 28, 1917, Naumann gives a keynote speech on the topic: “Unity and Progress, Our Common Slogan.”^[32] Throughout the war, Naumann maintained his position on the Armenian question.

But what role do the different conceptual concepts of the relationship between religion and politics play in Lepsius and Naumann for their specific behavior in the Armenian question? There is much evidence that people's individual response to crimes against humanity and genocide is first and foremost a strong and universal feeling. On the basis of man's universal capacity for empathy and compassion, a moral feeling emerges which requires urgent help for victims and prevention against the risk of repetition. In connection with the question of the universal validity of human rights, sociologist Nathan Sznaider points out that the universal claim of human rights is based on this universal moral sense of defense against inhumanity.^[33] In this sense, human rights have a “negative” reason; they can only be understood in the context of the specific historical experiences of inhumanity to which they react. This also applies to the concept of human dignity. What human dignity means cannot be derived from universally divided religious or ideological systems, not even from the legal system. However, from historical experience, we know relatively well what is universally perceived as a disregard for human dignity.

Friedrich Naumann also confesses that he initially feels this clear moral feeling when he writes that in view of the massacres of the Armenians, there can only be one verdict at all, namely a full, angry, severe condemnation of the murderers and their instigators.^[34] But the exaggeration of the national idea into the idea of world power and the absolutization of national interests ultimately mean that Naumann suppresses this moral impulse and releases national world power interests from any ethical commitment. Of course, this is only one facet of politician Naumann, but it remains a dark side.

In Lepsius, on the other hand, the Christian foundation of world politics he undertook seems to strengthen the moral impulse of compassion and help and to provide it with additional energy for action. With his tireless efforts to inform the public about the persecution of Armenians and with his aid organization in a time of limitless exaggeration of world power thinking in Germany, Lepsius set an impressive example of civil courage that was rarely found among the bourgeois elites in his time. That stays.

On the other hand, the political concept of the realisation of the Kingdom of God on earth, in which the Germans have a preferred task, is no longer compatible in this form, neither in dialogue between religions nor in political discourse, in awareness of the experiences of the two World Wars, the crimes of National Socialism against humanity and above all the destruction of German and European Jews. The idea of Germany's special vocation to shape the world has been thoroughly implemented. She herself contributed to their refutation. Under great power thinking, however, Lepsius has the more general idea that Christianity calls people to shape or even help shape the world according to the Gospel. If I see it correctly, this is no less true today, but even more widespread than in the time of Lepsius, to the self-image of Protestant Christianity. Christianity thus claims universal validity, in principle no different from the other major monotheistic religions of Judaism and Islam. This results in a tightrope walk for all monotheistic religions. Christians today must orient themselves in a secular, religiously and ideologically pluralistic and globalized world. This irrevocably requires mutual respect between religions and their trusting cooperation in shaping local, regional and global coexistence between people. And this requires the recognition of secular institutions of politics and law at all levels of the community, from the community to the United Nations. Because only secular institutions can, by virtue of their neutrality and distance in a multi-religious society, make binding decisions that must be accepted by everyone.

For this reason, the question of the relationship between religion and politics is no less urgent today than it was posed in the Armenian question at the time of Lepsius and Naumann. Isn't Naumann right when he insists that politics is about power and that religion has nothing to say about it. Social theory would in any case agree with the first part of this sentence. It regards the differentiation of functional subsystems or spheres of value as a defining characteristic of modern society. Nor does it seem desirable to us that politicians have a religious foundation.

But Lepsius probably didn't want to deny that politicians were following their own criteria. And he certainly had no priestly rule in mind. In his presentation, Lepsius describes “the old trail of this Congress” — the Evangelical Social Congress — with the words that he wanted “to give Christian ideas an immediate influence on public opinion and thus on politics, untouched by ecclesiastical and political party spirit.”^[35] Even though Lepsius has a certain affection against church institutions and political parties, this passage nevertheless shows how Lepsius imagines the process of influencing Christianity on politics: Influence on politics through public opinion. That is definitely a modern concept. It is even a fundamental concept for parliamentary democracy. In democracy, the will of the people is not a metaphysical, predetermined unity. It is only the result of a lively, open and controversial process of forming opinions and majorities. In parliamentary democracy, politics depends on the fact that suggestions, expressions of opinion and expressions of will are brought to them from all parts of society. This is also the way in which Christians can apply the standards of Christian ethics to political decisions. And in parliamentary democracy, there can no longer be any talk of Christians having nothing to say about issues of power in foreign policy.

[1] The negotiations of the Eleventh Evangelical Social Congress, held in Karlsruhe on June 7 and 8, 1900, in accordance with the shorthand protocols, Göttingen (Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht) 1900; quoted below: Minutes

[2] About Klaus Erich Pollmann, Evangelical Social Congress, in: Theological Real Encyclopedia, Vol. 10, 1982, p. 645 ff. m.w.n.; ders., Friedrich Naumann and the Evangelical Social Congress, in: Rüdiger vom Bruch, Friedrich Naumann in his time, Berlin 2000, p. 49 ff.; Kurt Nowak, Social Policy as a Cultural Mission. Adolf von Harnack and the Evangelical Social Congress, in: Jochen-Christoph Kaiser/Wilfried Loth (eds.), Social Reform in the Empire. Protestantism, Catholicism and Social Policy, Stuttgart et al. 1997, p. 79 ff.; Christian Nottmeier, Adolf von Harnack and German politics 1890 — 1930: a biographical study of the relationship between Protestantism, science and politics, Tübingen 2004, p. 189ff.; Gottfried Kretschmar, The Evangelical Social Congress, Stuttgart 1972; Paul Göhre, the Evangelical Social Movement, its History and Goals, Leipzig 1896

[3]Hans-Walter Schmuhl, Friedrich Naumann and the Armenian Question. The German public and the persecution of Armenians in 1915, ADK 2005, pp. 16 ff., 21

[4]Protocol (note 1) p. 151

[5]Protocol (note 1) p. 156

[6]Protocol (note 1) p. 180

[7]Protocol (note 1) p. 181

[8] The following sketch is based on the detailed presentation by Axel Meissner, Martin Rade's “Christian World” and Armenia. Building blocks for an international ethic of Protestantism, Berlin 2010, p. 18 ff. m.w.n.

[9]Axel Meissner (see note 8), p. 51 ff.

[10]Quoted from Meissner (note 8), p. 112 (footnote 479)

[11] A biography of Johannes Lepsius, which illuminates the complex contemporary and theological contexts of his work, is still a desideratum. Andreas Baumann's dissertation, The Orient for Christ, contains a biographical framework. Johannes Lepsius — Biography and Missiology, Gießen 2007, p. 20ff. Contributions to the biography can be found in Hermann Goltz, Between Germany and Armenia, among others. On the 125th birthday of the Protestant theologian Dr. Johannes Lepsius (15.12.1958 — 3.2.1926), Theologische Literaturzeitung 1983, p. 865 ff.; M. Rainer Lepsius, Johannes Lepsius — biographical sketch, in: Germany and Armenia 1914 — 1918 (reprint), Bremen 1986, p. 543; ders, Johannes Lepsius: The formation of his personality during adolescence and study, in: Files of the International .-Johannes Lepsius Symposium at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, edited by Hermann Goltz, Halle1987, p. 72 ff. Diverse references to the biography of Johannes Lepsius can also be found in Axel Meissner (note 8).

[12]Hartmut Mehlitz, Richard Lepsius. Egypt and the Order of Science, Berlin 2010

[13]From the wealth of literature on Friedrich Naumann, see Rüdiger vom Bruch, Friedrich Naumann in his time, Berlin 2000; Peter Theiner, Social Liberalism and German World Politics: Friedrich Naumann in Wilhelmine Germany, Baden-Baden 1983; Andreas Lindt, Friedrich Naumann and Max Weber: Theology and Sociology in Wilhelmine Germany, Munich 1973;, Friedrich Naumann. Principles and Approaches of His Politics in the National Social Period (1895 — 1903), in: Walter Hubatsch (ed.) , The fate of the German past. Contributions to the historical interpretation of the last 150 years. Commemorative publication for Siegfried A. Kähler, Düsseldorf 1950

[14] Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Transformations of Liberal Idea in the Age of Imperialism, in: Karlholl/Günther List (ed.), Liberalism and the Imperialist State. Imperialism as a problem of liberal parties in Germany 1890-1914, Göttingen 1975, pp. 109ff., 117

[15]Wolfgang J. Mommsen (note 14), p. 130

[16]see note 14

[17]On the following Hans-Walter Schmuhl (note 3), p. 15 ff.

[18] About this trip Klausjaschinski/Julius Waldschmidt (ed.), Des Keiser's Journey to the Orient 1898, Berlin 2002

‍¹⁹ Friedrich Naumann, Hinter Konstantinopel, in: DieHilfe, 4th ed., No. 45 dated 6.11.1898, p. 7

[19]Friedrich Naumann, On the Armenian Question, in: Christian World, 12th ed., No. 50 from 15.12.1898, Sp. 1185 - 1188

[20] Friedrich Naumann, loc. cit., Sp. 1186

[21]Friedrich Naumann, Asia, Athens, Constantinople, Baalbek, Damascus, Nazaret, Jeerusalem, Cairo, Naples, 6th ed., Berlin-Schöneberg 1907

[22] Friedrich Naumann, loc. cit., p. 141

[23]Protocol p. 150

[24]Hans-Lukas Kieser, Zion — Armenia — Germany. Johannes Lepsius and the “Protestant International” in the Late Ottoman World, ADK 2009, p. 15 ff.

[25]Minutes p. 152 f.

[26]Minutes p. 153 et seq.

[27]Protocol p. 154

[28] Protocol p. 176

[29]Protocol p. 179

[30]Protocol p. 180

[31] Protocol p. 181

[32]Walter Schmuhl, loc. cit., p. 20 m.w.N.

[33] Natan Sznaider, The Moral Sense. Poetic language, sacred power and the suffering of others: For a negative justification of human rights, Frankfurter Rundschau, November 10, 2010, pp. 32 - 33

[34]Friedrich Naumann, On the Armenian Question, in: Christian World, 12th ed., No. 50 from 15.12.1898, Sp. 1185 ff., 1186

[35]Protocol p. 148